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Can a model with limited labor market insurance explain standard macro and labor market 
data jointly? We construct a monetary model in which: i) the unemployed are worse off 
than the employed, i.e. unemployment is involuntary and ii) the labor force participation 
rate varies with the business cycle. To illustrate key features of our model, we start with 
the simplest possible framework. We then integrate the model into a medium-sized DSGE 
model and show that the resulting model does as well as existing models at accounting 
for the response of standard macroeconomic variables to monetary policy shocks and two 
technology shocks. In addition, the model does well at accounting for the response of the 
labor force and unemployment rate to these three shocks.
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Can a model with limited labor market insurance explain standard macro and labor market data jointly? To answer this 
question, we construct a monetary model in which the unemployed are worse off than the employed, i.e. unemployment is 
involuntary and the labor force participation rate varies with the business cycle. We investigate whether the resulting model 
fits standard real and nominal macro data and unemployment and labor force participation data in response to monetary 
policy and technology shocks.1
✩ Many people and seminar participants provided us with excellent comments for which we are very grateful. The views expressed in this paper are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Sveriges Riksbank.
* Corresponding authors.
E-mail addresses: l-christiano@northwestern.edu (L.J. Christiano), mathias.trabandt@gmail.com (M. Trabandt), karl.walentin@riksbank.se (K. Walentin).
1 We are interested in a monetary environment since it allows us to study the general equilibrium repercussions between e.g. unemployment, inflation 
and nominal interest rates. In addition, monetary models such as Christiano et al. (2005, CEE) and Altig et al. (2011, ACEL) have proved to be useful to 
account for VAR-based evidence for real and nominal variables in response to monetary as well as technology shocks. The model features developed in CEE 
and ACEL have become standard ingredients in modern business cycle models, see e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) and many others. Integrating our 
model of unemployment into such an environment therefore provides a useful empirical test for our approach to the labor market in general.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2020.05.003
1094-2025/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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of the Great Recession. A shortcoming of standard monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models is that 
they are silent about these important variables. Work has begun on the task of introducing unemployment into monetary 
DSGE models. The Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching approach of unemployment represents a leading 
framework and has been integrated into monetary models by a number of authors.2
However, the approaches taken to date have several important shortcomings. First, they assume the existence of perfect 
consumption insurance against labor market outcomes, so that consumption is the same for employed and non-employed 
workers.3 With this kind of insurance, a worker is delighted to be unemployed because it is an opportunity to enjoy leisure 
without a drop in consumption.4 In other words, unemployment in these models is voluntary rather than involuntary. 
Second, it is generally assumed that labor force participation is constant and exogenous. This assumption was challenged 
during the recovery after the Great Recession, when policymakers saw that much of the initial drop in unemployment 
reflected a puzzling drop in labor force participation. This increased demand from policymakers for models that capture the 
business cycle dynamics in labor force participation (for further discussion, see Christiano et al. (2015)).
To remedy these limitations, we pursue an approach to model the labor market that has not been used in the monetary 
DSGE literature. Our approach follows the work of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and others, in which finding a job 
requires exerting a privately observed effort.5 In this type of environment, the higher utility enjoyed by employed workers 
is necessary for people to have the incentive to search for and keep jobs.6 Moreover, our approach implies that workers 
take an optimal decision whether or not to join the labor force. In other words, the labor force participation margin in our 
framework responds endogenously to business cycle shocks.
We define unemployment the way it is defined by the agencies that collect the data. To be officially unemployed a 
person must assert that she (i) has recently taken concrete steps to secure employment and (ii) is currently available 
for work.7 To capture (i) we assume that people who wish to be employed must undertake a costly effort. Our model 
has the implication that a person who asserts (i) and (ii) enjoys more utility if she finds a job than if she does not, i.e., 
unemployment is involuntary. Empirical evidence appears to be consistent with the notion that unemployment is in practice 
more of a burden than a blessing.8 For example, Chetty and Looney (2007) and Gruber (1997) find that U.S. workers suffer 
roughly a 10 percent drop in consumption when they lose their job. Also, there is a substantial literature which purports 
to find evidence that insurance against labor market outcomes is imperfect. An early example is Cochrane (1991). These 
observations motivate our third defining characteristic of unemployment: (iii) a person looking for work is worse off if they 
fail to find a job than if they find one.9
To highlight the mechanisms in our model, we first introduce it into the simplest possible framework. In our model, 
workers gather into “households” for the purpose of partially ensuring themselves against bad labor market outcomes. We 
regard the “household” as a label or stand-in for all the various market and non-market arrangements that actual workers 
have for dealing with idiosyncratic labor market outcomes.10 In line with this view of the household, workers are assumed 
to have no access to loan markets, while households have access to complete markets.
Each worker experiences a privately observed shock that determines its aversion to work. Workers that experience a 
sufficiently high aversion to work stay out of the labor force. The other workers join the labor force and are employed with 
2 Examples include Blanchard and Galí (2010), Campolmi and Gnocchi (2016) Christiano et al. (2008), Christiano et al. (2011b), Christoffel et al. (2009a), 
Christoffel and Kuester (2008), Christoffel et al. (2009b), den Haan et al. (2000), Gertler et al. (2008), Groshenny (2009), Krause et al. (2008), Lechthaler et 
al. (2010), Sala et al. (2008), Sveen and Weinke (2008, 2009), Thomas (2011), Trigari (2009) and Walsh (2005).
3 Gornemann et al. (2016) model unemployment in a search and matching framework allowing for household heterogeneity in terms of wealth in an 
incomplete-market setting, i.e. emphasizing self-insurance against unemployment while abstracting from the labor force participation decision. The main 
focus of Gornemann et al. (2016) is on the distributional effects of monetary policy.
4 The drop in utility reflects that models typically assume preferences that are additively separable in consumption and labor or that have the King et al. 
(1988) form. Examples include all papers cited in footnote 2.
5 An early paper that considers unobserved effort is Shavell and Weiss (1979). Our approach is also closely related to the efficiency wage literature, as in 
Alexopoulos (2004). The present paper is also related to Landais et al. (2012) who study the cyclicality of optimal unemployment insurance in a real model 
with imperfect labor market insurance. However, the authors barely spell out the macro implications of their approach. In contrast to these authors, we 
study the implications of limited labor market insurance in a monetary model and, more importantly, examine the ability of the approach to explain actual 
macro- and labor market data in response to technology and monetary policy shocks quantitatively.
6 Lack of perfect insurance in practice probably reflects other factors too, such as adverse selection. Alternatively, Kocherlakota (1996) explores lack of 
commitment as a rationale for incomplete insurance. Lack of perfect insurance is not necessary for the unemployed to be worse off than the employed (see 
Rogerson and Wright, 1988).
7 See the Bureau of Labor Statistics website, http://www.bls .gov /cps /cps _htgm .htm #unemployed, for an extended discussion of the definition of unem-
ployment, including the survey questions used to determine a household’s employment status.
8 There is a substantial sociological literature that associates unemployment with an increased likelihood of suicide and domestic violence.
9 Although the great majority of monetary DSGE models that we know of fail (iii), they do not fail (ii). In these models there are workers who are 
not employed and who would say ‘yes’ in response to the question, ‘are you currently available for work?’. Although such people in effect declare their 
willingness to take an action that reduces utility, they would in fact do so. This is because they are members of a large household insurance pool. They 
obey the household’s instruction that they value a job according to the value assigned by the household, not themselves. In these models everything about 
the individual worker is observable to the household, and it is implicitly assumed that the household has the technology necessary to enforce verifiable 
behavior. In our environment - and we suspect this is true in practice - the presence of private information makes it impossible to enforce a labor market 
allocation that does not completely reflect the preferences of the individual worker.
10 Alternative labels in this regard would be “a zero profit insurance company”, “the government”, “a social planner” or “a representative agent”.
28 L.J. Christiano et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 39 (2021) 26–54a probability that is an increasing function of a privately observed effort. The only thing about a worker that is observed 
is whether or not it is employed. Although consumption insurance is desirable in our environment, perfect insurance is not 
feasible because everyone would claim high work aversion and stay out of the labor force.
For simplicity we suppose the wage rate is determined competitively so that firms and households take it as given.11
Firms face no search frictions and hire workers up to the point where marginal costs and benefits are equated. But it is 
important to note that our modeling approach in principle could encompass search frictions for firms and wage bargaining, 
and that the friction that we emphasize – workers have to make a job finding effort which is unobservable – might well be 
viewed as a complement to the currently dominating paradigm. At this point it is worth emphasizing that unemployment 
in our model is purely frictional. It is not generated by unions or other factors pushing up the general wage level to a point 
where supply exceeds demand. However, note that our environment is flexible enough to allow for market power in the 
labor market, as will be the case in the estimated medium-sized DSGE model that we present in section 3.
Although individual workers face uncertainty, households are sufficiently large that there is no uncertainty at the house-
hold level. Once the household sets incentives by allocating more consumption to employed workers than to non-employed 
workers, it knows exactly how many workers will find work. The household takes the wage rate as given and adjusts 
employment incentives until the marginal cost (in terms of foregone leisure and reduced consumption insurance) of addi-
tional market work equals the marginal benefit. The firm and household first order necessary conditions of optimization 
are sufficient to determine the equilibrium wage rate. It turns out that our environment has a simple representative agent 
formulation, in which the representative household has an indirect utility function that is a function only of market con-
sumption and labor.
Our theory of unemployment has interesting implications for the optimal variation of labor market insurance over the 
business cycle. In a boom more labor is demanded by firms. To satisfy the higher demand, the household provides workers 
with more incentives to look for work by raising consumption for the employed, cwt , relative to consumption of the non-
employed, cnwt . Conversely, in a recession, the consumption premium falls and thus the replacement ratio, cnwt /cwt , increases. 
Thus, our model implies a procyclical consumption premium – or equivalently – a countercyclical replacement ratio. Put 
differently, optimal labor market insurance is countercyclical in our model.
Next, we introduce our model of unemployment into a medium-sized monetary DSGE model that has been fit to data. In 
particular, we work with a version of the model proposed in Christiano et al. (2005) (CEE). In this model there is monopoly 
power in the setting of wages, there are wage setting frictions, capital accumulation and other features.12 We estimate 
and evaluate our model using the Bayesian version of the impulse response matching procedure proposed in Christiano et 
al. (2011a) (CTW). The impulse response methodology has proved useful in the basic model formulation stage of model 
construction, and this is why we use it here. The three shocks we consider are the same ones as in ACEL. In particular, we 
consider VAR-based estimates of the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy shock, a neutral 
technology shock and an investment-specific technology shock. Our model can match the impulse responses of standard 
macro variables as well as the standard model, i.e. the model in CEE and ACEL. However, our model also does a good job 
matching the responses of the labor force and unemployment to the three shocks.
Our paper emphasizes the importance of labor supply for the dynamics of unemployment and the labor force and is 
thereby related to Galí (2011). In his model, the presence of unemployment rests on the assumption of market power in 
the labor market. By contrast, in our model unemployment reflects frictions that are necessary for people to find jobs and 
does not require monopoly power. Further, Galí (2011) assumes i) that available jobs can be found without effort and ii) the 
presence of perfect labor market insurance which implies that the employed have lower utility than the non-employed, i.e. 
unemployment is voluntary from an individual workers perspective. Finally, Galí’s theory of unemployment with standard 
preferences implies a drop of labor supply in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock.13 The drop in labor 
supply is counterfactual, according to our VAR-based evidence. We estimate the standard model that contains Galí’s theory 
of unemployment with and without imposing data for unemployment and the labor force. In both cases, our model of 
involuntary unemployment outperforms the standard model in terms of data fit.
These results highlight another important implication of our work. In particular, it is in general not sufficient to account 
only for the response of employment or total hours to be able to draw conclusions about the unemployment rate. In 
particular, when the standard model is estimated without data on unemployment and the labor force, the fit of total hours 
of the model is in fact very good. By contrast, the implications of the model for unemployment and the labor force are 
counterfactual. Conversely, when the standard model is estimated on unemployment and labor force data too, the fit of 
these two variables indeed improves somewhat. However the improvement of fit comes at the cost of not fitting total hours 
well. In other words, the standard model provides an example that it is not straightforward to account for the dynamics of 
unemployment and labor force participation jointly with other standard macroeconomic variables. By contrast, our model 
does a good job in this regard.
11 One interpretation of our environment is that job markets occur on Lucas-Phelps-Prescott type islands. Effort is required to reach those islands, but a 
person who arrives at the island finds a perfectly competitive labor market. For recent work that uses a metaphor of this type, see Veracierto (2008).
12 The model of wage setting is the one proposed in Erceg et al. (2000).
13 This drop in labor supply, or the labor force, is induced by the positive wealth effect. Galí (2011) and Galí et al. (2011) show that changes to the 
household utility function that offset wealth effects reduce the counterfactual implications of the standard model for the labor force.
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sumption premium is procyclical while the replacement ratio is countercyclical. Studies of the cross-sectional variance of log 
household consumption are a potential source of evidence on the cyclical behavior of the premium. Evidence in Heathcote 
et al. (2010) suggests indeed that the dispersion in log household non-durable consumption decreased in the 1980, 2001 
and 2007 recessions. Thus, the observed cross sectional dispersion of consumption across households lends support to our 
model’s implication that the consumption premium is procyclical. Another indication that the replacement ratio may indeed 
be countercyclical is the fact that the duration of unemployment benefits is routinely extended in recessions, e.g. in the U.S. 
during the Great Recession. Second, our model predicts that high unemployment in recessions reflects the procyclicality of 
effort in job search. There is some evidence that supports this implication of the model. Data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics suggests that the number of “discouraged workers” jumped 70 percent from 2008Q1 to 2009Q1. The number of 
discouraged workers is only a tiny fraction of the labor force. However, to the extent that the sentiments of discouraged 
workers are shared by workers more generally, a jump in the number of discouraged workers could be a signal of a general 
decline in job search intensity in recessions.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section lays out our basic model of limited labor market insurance. 
Section 3 proceed by integrating our model into the medium-sized DSGE (CEE) model. After that, in section 4, we describe 
our estimation method. Section 5 reports the estimation results for our model. Moreover, section 6 discusses some microe-
conomic implications and examines evidence that provides tentative support for the model. The paper ends with concluding 
remarks.
2. Model of limited labor market insurance
We begin by describing the physical environment of a typical worker. Workers are subject to two sources of privately 
observed idiosyncratic uncertainty: a shock to work aversion, l, and the uncertainty of finding employment for workers that 
participate in the labor market. In this environment, there is a need for insurance, but insurance cannot be perfect because 
of the presence of asymmetric information. With standard separable preferences in consumption and leisure, under perfect 
insurance all workers would enjoy the same level of consumption, regardless of their realized value of l and of whether or 
not they find employment. Under this first-best insurance arrangement, workers would have no incentive to participate in 
the labor market and if they did, they would then have no incentive to exert effort in finding work. Instead, we consider 
the optimal insurance arrangement in the presence of asymmetric information. The optimal insurance contract balances the 
trade-off between incentive and insurance provision.
Under the insurance arrangement, workers band together into large households. Individual workers have no access to 
credit or insurance markets other than through their arrangements with the household. In part, we view the household 
construct as a stand-in for the market and non-market arrangements that actual workers use to insure against idiosyncratic 
labor market experiences. In part, we are following Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995), in using the household construct 
as a technical device to prevent the appearance of difficult-to-model wealth dispersion among workers. Households have 
sufficiently many members that there is no idiosyncratic household-level labor market uncertainty. The environment is 
sufficiently simple that we can obtain an analytic representation for the equally weighted utility of all the workers in a 
household. This utility function corresponds to the preferences in a representative agent formulation of our economy. At the 
end of this section, we discuss some important implications of our basic model structure.
2.1. Workers
The economy consists of a continuum of households. In turn, each household consists of a continuum of workers. A 
worker can either work, or not.14 At the start of the period, each worker draws a privately observed idiosyncratic shock, l, 
from a stochastic process with support, [0,1].15 We assume the stochastic process for l exhibits dependence over time and 
that its invariant distribution is uniform. A worker’s realized value of l determines her utility cost of working:
ς (1 + σL) lσL . (2.1)
The parameters ς and σL ≥ 0 are common to all workers. In (2.1) we have structured the utility cost of employment so that 
σL affects its variance in the cross section and not its mean.16
After drawing l, a worker decides whether or not to participate in the labor force. In case a worker chooses non-






14 In assuming that labor is indivisible, we follow Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988). The indivisible labor assumption has attracted substantial attention 
recently. See, for example, Mulligan (2001), and Krusell et al. (2008, 2011). The labor indivisibility assumption is consistent with the fact that most variation 
in total hours worked over the business cycle reflects variations in number of people employed, rather than in hours per worker.
15 A recent paper which emphasizes a richer pattern of idiosyncracies at the individual firm and household level is Brown et al. (2015).
16 To see this, note that ∫ 10 (1 + σL) lσL dl = 1 and ∫ 10 [(1 + σL) lσL − 1]2 dl = σ 2L1+2σ .L
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where el,t ≥ 0 is a privately 




)= η̃t + ael,t (2.3)
where a > 0. The sign of a implies that the marginal product of effort is non-negative. Further,
η̃t = η +M (m̄t/m̄t−1) (2.4)
where η < 0. We discuss the negative sign of η below. The function M (m̄t/m̄t−1) reflects the impact of aggregate economic 
conditions – in particular the change of the aggregate labor force m̄t/m̄t−1 – on the worker’s probability to find work. We 
will discuss details about the function M in subsection 3.4 and in subsection B.6 in the technical appendix.17
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Here, e2l,t/2 is the utility cost associated with effort. In (2.6), c
w
t and cnwt denote the consumption of employed and non-
employed workers, respectively. These are outside the control of a worker and are determined in equilibrium given the 
arrangements which we describe below. In addition, η̃t is also outside the control of a worker. Our notation reflects that 
in our environment, an individual worker’s consumption can only be dependent on its current employment status because 
this is the only worker characteristic that is publicly observed.18
We now characterize the effort and labor force participation decisions of the worker. Because workers’ work aversion 
type and effort choice are private information, their effort and labor force decisions are privately optimal conditional on 
cnwt and cwt . In particular, the worker decides its level of effort and labor force participation by comparing the magnitude of 
(2.2) with the maximized value of (2.6). In the case of indifference, we assume the worker chooses non-participation.
2.2. Characterizing worker behavior
As described above, the worker takes the replacement ratio rt ≡ cnwt /cwt < 1 as given. The workers’s utility of participat-














)≡ p (el,t; η̃t)[ln( cwt − bCt−1cnwt − bCt−1
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Define r̃t = c
nw
t −bCt−1
cwt −bCt−1 and note the distinction between this expression and the replacement ratio, rt if b > 0. Then, the 










)≡ p (el,t; η̃t) [ln (1/r̃t)− ς (1 + σL) lσL ]− 12 e2l,t . (2.7)
We suppose that if more than one value of el,t solves (2.7), then the worker chooses the smaller of the two. The worker 
chooses non-participation if the maximized value of (2.7) is smaller than, or equal to, zero.
17 The technical appendix is available at the following URL: http://sites .google .com /site /mathiastrabandt /home /downloads /CTWinvoluntary _techapp .pdf.
18 For example, we do not allow worker consumption allocations to depend upon the employment history or the history of worker reports of l. We make 
this assumption to preserve tractability. It would be interesting to investigate whether the results are very sensitive to our assumption that consumption is 
not allowed to depend on the individual history. We suspect that if the history of past reports were publicly known, then the difference between discounted 
utility when household types and labor effort are public or private would narrow (see, e.g., Atkeson and Lucas, 1995).
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)≡ p̃ (el,t; η̃t) [ln (1/r̃t)− ς (1 + σL) lσL ]− 12 e2l,t . (2.8)
The function, f̃ , is quadratic with negative second derivative, and so the unique value of el,t that solves the above problem 
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There exists a unique 0 < l < 1 such that the object in square brackets in (2.10) is zero. That value of l is the labor force 






)− ς (1 + σL)mσLt ]= −2a η̃t . (2.11)










which implies that the utility of the marginal labor force participant from the extra consumption from working equals the 













Note that for all l ≥ mt such that ẽl,t ≥ 0, f̃
(
ẽl,t; η̃t , r̃t
) ≤ 0 and for all l < mt , f̃ (ẽl,t; η̃t , r̃t) > 0. Furthermore, we impose 
the following restriction, which ensures an interior solution for the labor force participation rate (see section A.2.1 in the 












)− ς (1 + σL)] . (2.14)
We can then summarize our findings in the form of the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that (2.14) is satisfied and the worker’s objective is described in (2.8), with r̃t taken as given by the worker. 
Let mt be as defined by (2.13). Then workers with mt ≤ l ≤ 1 choose non-participation and workers with l < mt and ẽl,t ≥ 0 choose 
participation. For those who choose participation, their effort level is given by (2.9).
The previous proposition was derived under the assumption that the workers’s objective is (2.8). We use the results 




. One can show that 
there is a largest value of l, denoted l̊t , such that for all l ≤ l̊t , the constraint, p 
(
el,t; η̃t
)≤ 1 is binding. In other words, there 
is a share of workers l̊t that has p 
(
el,t; η̃t




)= η̃t + a2 [ln (1/r̃t)− ς (1 + σL) l̊σLt ]= 1,













19 Considering the unconstrained case first will be helpful to understand more easily the constrained case, i.e. el,t ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ p 
(
el,t ; η̃t
) ≤ 1 which we 
characterize below.
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Before deriving the representative household’s utility, u (Ct ,ht), as a function of household aggregate employment, ht , and 
household aggregate consumption, Ct , it is useful to derive a few helpful equilibrium conditions. The number of employed 



















= −η̃tmt + a2ςσLmσL+1t + l̊t
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Combining the latter equation with expression (2.15) to substitute out for 1 + η̃t and re-arranging yields:





Note that one can use (2.15) to rewrite this expression for employment as:
ht = −η̃tmt + a2ςσL
⎛⎝mσL+1t − [mσLt − 1 + η̃tς (1 + σL)a2
] σL+1
σL
⎞⎠≡ Q (mt; η̃t)
or





where Q −1 is the inverse function of Q . We show in the technical appendix section A.8 that the mapping between ht and 
mt is unique. As we will see below, expression (2.18) will be useful when computing the household utility function.
Equation (2.17) can also be re-arranged to obtain the following expression for the unemployment rate:
ut = mt − ht
mt
=











Suppose the household decides to send a measure, ht , of workers to work and to consume Ct . The household that has 
chosen a level of employment, ht , must set the labor force, mt , to the level indicated by (2.18). To ensure that a measure, 
mt , of workers has the incentive to enter the labor force requires setting the consumption premium as indicated by (2.11). 




t + (1 − ht) cnwt = Ct, (2.20)
determines the level of cwt and cnwt . Solving this expression for cnwt yields
cnwt =
rt Ct
ht + (1 − ht) rt . (2.21)
The consumption of employed workers can then be obtained by using cwt = cnwt /rt .
Note that in our environment there is no reason to describe a household optimization problem for selecting cnwt or 
cwt since there is only one setting for these variables that satisfies the resource constraint, (2.20), and the labor force 
participation constraint, (2.12).
2.4. Household utility function
The equally weighted utility of the workers within the household is given by:











)− ς (1 + σL) lσL ]
+ (1 − p (el,t; η̃t)) ln (cnwt − bCt−1)− 12 e2l,t
)
dl




20 See the technical appendix section A.7 for the intermediate steps in the derivation of the following equation.
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derivation of the following expression for household utility is described in the technical appendix sections A.3-A.8:
u(Ct,ht; Ct−1, η̃t) = ln (Ct − bCt−1) − z(ht; η̃t), (2.22)
where

















mσLt − α2σL2 mt + α4
(
1 + η̃t





ς(1+σL)mσL − 2a2 η̃t
]
and mt is a function of ht given by equation (2.18), η̃t is given by equation (2.4) and the expression for r̃t can be obtained 
by rearranging (2.13).21
A notable feature of (2.22) is that consumption enters the household’s utility function in the same way that it enters the 
individual worker’s utility function. Moreover, consumption and employment are separable in utility.




Here zh (zhh) denotes the first (second) derivative of z with respect to h, evaluated in steady state. Note that 1/σz is the 
consumption-compensated elasticity of household labor supply in steady state. In our environment, all changes in labor 
supply occur on the extensive margin, so the empirical counterpart to 1/σz is the extensive-margin labor supply.
2.5. Implications of our basic model structure
We now briefly discuss expression (2.22) as well as implications of our basic model structure.
First, note that the derivation of the household utility function, (2.22), involves no explicit maximization problem even 
though the resulting insurance arrangement is optimal given our information assumption. This is because the household 
labor force participation and resource constraints, (2.11) and (2.20), are sufficient to determine cwt and cnwt conditional on 
ht and Ct .
Second, we can see from (2.22) that our model is likely to be characterized by a particular observational equivalence 
property. To see this, note that although the agents in our model are in fact heterogeneous, Ct and ht are chosen as if the 
economy were populated by a representative agent with the utility function specified in (2.22). A model such as the one in 
Clarida et al. (1999, henceforth CGG) which specifies representative agent utility as the sum of the log of consumption and a 
separable disutility of labor term is indistinguishable from our model, as long as data on the labor force and unemployment 
are not used. This is particularly obvious if, as is the case here, we only study the linearized dynamics of the model about 
the steady state. In this case, the only properties of a model’s utility function that are used are its second order derivative 
properties in the nonstochastic steady state.
Third, our model and the standard CGG model are distinguished by the following two features: i) our model addresses 
a larger set of time series than the standard model does and ii) in our model the representative agent’s utility function is 
a reduced form object. With respect to the utility function, its properties are determined by i) the details of the technology 
of job search, and ii) the cross-sectional variation in preferences with regard to attitudes about market work. As a result, 
the basic structure of the utility function in our model can in principle be informed by time use surveys and studies of job 
search.22
Fourth, we gain insight into the determinants of the unemployment rate in the model by re-stating (2.19):






Ceteris paribus, a rise in the labor force, mt , is associated with a fall in the unemployment rate, ut . To generate the 
fall in the unemployment rate, the rise in employment must be larger than the rise in the labor force. The greater rise 
in employment reflects that an increase in the labor force requires raising employment incentives, and this generates an 
increase in search intensity.
21 In the technical appendix, in equation (A.34), we express equation (2.23) in a way that is more useful for computational purposes.
22 A similar point was made by Benhabib et al. (1991). They argue that a representative agent utility function of consumption and labor should be 
interpreted as a reduced form object, after non-market consumption and labor activities have been maximized out. From this perspective, construction of 
the representative agent’s utility function can in principle be guided by surveys of how time in the home is used.
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This equation shows that when the labor force, mt , increases in a boom, the equilibrium consumption premium, cwt /cnwt
increases. The boom results in more labor demanded by firms. In order to satisfy the higher demand, the household provides 
workers with more incentives to look for work by raising consumption for the employed, cwt , relative to consumption of the 
non-employed, cnwt . Conversely, in a recession, the consumption premium falls and thus the replacement ratio rt = cnwt /cwt
increases.23 In other words, our model implies that workers are provided with more insurance in a recession, i.e. optimal 
labor market insurance is countercyclical.
3. Limited labor market insurance in a medium-sized DSGE model
Next, we show how we embed our model of limited labor market insurance into an otherwise standard medium-sized 
New Keynesian DSGE framework as e.g. CEE or Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007).
3.1. Final and intermediate goods








⎤⎦λ f , 1 < λ f . (3.1)





K αi,t − φt, (3.2)
where Ki,t denotes capital services used for production by the ith intermediate good producer. Also, log (zt) is a technology 
shock whose first difference has a positive mean and φt denotes a fixed production cost which we will discuss below. The 
economy has two sources of growth: the positive drift in log (zt) and a positive drift in log (t), where t is the state of an 
investment-specific technology shock discussed below. Let z+t be defined as z+t = 
α
1−α
t zt . Along a non-stochastic steady state 
growth path, Yt/z+t and Yi,t/z
+
t converge to constants. The two shocks, zt and t , are specified to be unit root processes in 
order to be consistent with the assumptions we use in our VAR analysis to identify the dynamic response of the economy 
to neutral and capital-embodied technology shocks. The two shocks have the following time series representations:
	 log zt = μz + εnt , E
(
εnt
)2 = (σn)2 (3.3)





)2 = (σψ )2 . (3.4)
Our assumption that the neutral technology shock follows a random walk matches closely the finding in Smets and Wouters 
(2007) who estimate log zt to be highly autocorrelated. The direct empirical analysis of Prescott (1986) also supports the 
notion that log zt is a random walk.
In (3.2), Hi,t denotes homogeneous labor services hired by the ith intermediate good producer. Intermediate good firms 
must borrow the wage bill in advance of production, so that one unit of labor costs is given by Wt Rt where Rt denotes the 
gross nominal rate of interest. Intermediate good firms are subject to Calvo price-setting frictions. With probability ξp the 
intermediate good firm cannot reoptimize its price, in which case it is assumed to set its price according to the following 
rule:
Pi,t = π̄ Pi,t−1, (3.5)
where π̄ is the steady state inflation rate. With probability 1 − ξp the intermediate good firm can reoptimize its price. Apart 
from the fixed cost, the ith intermediate good producer’s profits are:
23 The estimated model discussed in the next section features habit formation and a time-varying η̃t . We verified numerically that in the estimated model, 
the consumption premium is pro-cyclical too.
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∞∑
j=0
β jυt+ j{Pi,t+ j Y i,t+ j − st+ j Pt+ j Y i,t+ j},
where st denotes the marginal cost of production, denominated in units of the homogeneous good. st is a function only 
of the costs of capital and labor, and is described in the technical appendix, section B.11.1. In the firm’s discounted profits, 
β jυt+ j is the multiplier on the households’s nominal period t + j budget constraint. The equilibrium conditions associated 
with this optimization problem are reported in section B.11.1 of the technical appendix.
We suppose that the homogeneous labor hired by intermediate good producers is itself ‘produced’ by competitive labor 









⎤⎦λw , 1 < λw . (3.6)
Labor contractors take the wage rate of Ht and ht, j as given and equal to Wt and Wt, j , respectively. Profit maximization by 
labor contractors leads to the following first order necessary condition:







Equation (3.7) is the demand curve for the jth type of labor.
3.2. Worker and household preferences
We integrate the model of unemployment in the previous section into the Erceg et al. (2000) (EHL) model of sticky 
wages that is commonly used in empirically relevant DSGE models. Each type, j ∈ [0,1], of labor is assumed to be supplied 
by a particular household. The jth household resembles the single representative household in the previous section, with 
one exception. The exception is that the unit measure of workers in the jth household is only able to supply the jth type 
of labor service. Each worker in the jth household has the utility cost of working, (2.1), and the technology for job finding, 
(2.5). The preference and job finding technology parameters are the same across households.
Let cnwj,t and c
w
j,t denote the consumption levels allocated by the j
th household to non-employed and employed workers 
within the household. Although households all enjoy the same level of consumption, Ct , for reasons described momentarily 
each household experiences a different level of employment, h j,t . Because employment across households is different, each 
type j household chooses a different way to balance the trade-off between the need for consumption insurance and the 
need to provide work incentives. For the jth type of household with high h j,t , the premium of consumption for employed 











where m j,t solves the analog of (2.17):






l̊σLj,t = mσLj,t −
1 + η̃t
ς (1 + σL)a2 . (3.9)
Consider the jth household that enjoys a level of household consumption and employment, Ct and h j,t , respectively. 








Ct − bCt−1) − z(h j,t; η̃t
)]
. (3.10)
Note that the utility function is additively separable, like the utility functions assumed for the workers. Additive sep-
arability is convenient because perfect consumption insurance at the level of households implies that consumption is not 
indexed by labor type, j.
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The jth household is the monopoly supplier of the jth type of labor service. The household understands that when it 
arranges work incentives for its workers so that employment is h j,t , then the nominal wage W j,t takes on the value implied 
by the demand for its type of labor, (3.7). The household therefore faces the standard monopoly problem of selecting W j,t
to optimize the welfare, (3.10), of its member workers. It does so subject to the requirement that it satisfy the demand for 
labor, (3.7), in each period. We follow EHL in supposing that the household experiences Calvo-style frictions in its choice 
of W j,t . In particular, with probability 1 − ξw the jth household has the opportunity to reoptimize its wage rate. With the 
complementary probability, the household must set its wage rate according to the following rule:
W j,t = π̃w,t W j,t−1 (3.11)
π̃w,t = (πt−1)κw (π̄ )(1−κw ) μz+ , (3.12)
where κw ∈ [0,1]. Note that in a non-stochastic steady state, non-optimizing households raise their real wage at the rate of 
growth of the economy. Because optimizing households also do this in steady state, it follows that in the steady state, the 
wage of each type of household is the same.
In principle, the presence of wage setting frictions implies that households have idiosyncratic levels of wealth and, hence, 
consumption. However, we follow EHL in supposing that each household has access to perfect consumption insurance. At 
the level of the household, there is no private information about consumption or employment. The private information 
and associated incentive problems all exist among the workers inside a household. Because of the additive separability of 
the household utility function, perfect consumption insurance at the level of households implies equal consumption across 
households. We have used this property of the equilibrium to simplify our notation and not include a subscript, j, on the 
jth household’s consumption. Of course, we hasten to add that although consumption is equated across households, it is not 
constant across workers.







+ Bt+1 ≤ Wt, jht, j + Xkt K̄t + Rt−1 Bt + a jt . (3.13)
Here, Bt+1 denotes the quantity of risk-free bonds purchased by the worker, Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate 
on bonds purchased in period t − 1 which pay off in period t , and a jt denotes the payments and receipts associated with 
the insurance on the timing of wage reoptimization. Also, Pt denotes the aggregate price level and It denotes the quantity 
of investment goods purchased for augmenting the beginning-of-period t + 1 stock of physical capital, K̄t+1. The price of 
investment goods is Pt/t , where t is the unit root process with positive drift specified in (3.4). This is our way of 
capturing the trend decline in the relative price of investment goods.24
The household owns the economy’s physical stock of capital, K̄t , sets the utilization rate of capital and rents the services 
of capital in a competitive market. The household accumulates capital using the following technology:








Here, S is a convex function which we discuss below.
For each unit of K̄t+1 acquired in period t , the household receives Xkt+1 in net cash payments in period t + 1,




where ukt denotes the rate of utilization of capital. The first term in (3.15) is the gross nominal period t + 1 rental income 
from a unit of K̄t+1. The household supply of capital services in period t + 1 is:
Kt+1 = ukt+1 K̄t+1.
It is the services of capital that intermediate good producers rent and use in their production functions, (3.2). The second 
term to the right of the equality in (3.15) represents the cost of capital utilization, a(ukt+1)Pt+1/t+1 which we discuss 
below.
The household’s problem is to select sequences, 
{
Ct , It , ukt , W j,t, Bt+1, K̄t+1
}
, to maximize (3.10) subject to (3.7), (3.11), 
(3.12), (3.13), (3.14), (3.15) and the mechanism determining when wages can be reoptimized. The equilibrium conditions 
associated with this maximization problem are standard, and so appear in section B.11.2 of the technical appendix.
24 We suppose that there is an underlying technology for converting final goods, Yt , one-to-one into Ct and one to t into investment goods. These 
technologies are operated by competitive firms which equate price to marginal cost. The marginal cost of Ct with this technology is Pt and the marginal 
cost of It is Pt/t . We avoid a full description of this environment so as to not clutter the presentation, and simply impose these properties of equilibrium 
on the household budget constraint.
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Goods market clearing dictates that the homogeneous output good is allocated among alternative uses as follows:
Yt = Gt + Ct + Ĩt . (3.16)
Here, Ct denotes household consumption, Gt denotes exogenous government consumption and Ĩt is a homogenous invest-











As discussed above, the investment goods, It , are used by the households to add to the physical stock of capital, K̄t , accord-




K̄t , arising from capital utilization, 
ukt . Finally, t in (3.17) denotes the unit root investment specific technology shock with positive drift discussed after (3.2).

























where εR,t is an iid monetary policy shock with unit variance and σR scales the effective variance of monetary policy 
shocks. As in CEE and ACEL, we assume that period t realizations of εR are not included in the period t information set 
of workers and firms, so that the only variable that is contemporaneously affected by the monetary policy shock is the 
nominal interest rate.
Let gdpt denote scaled real GDP defined as:
gdpt = Gt + Ct + It/t
z+t
, (3.19)
and gdp denote the nonstochastic steady state value of gdpt .
We adopt the following specification for government spending, Gt , and the fixed cost of production, φt , in response to 
technology shocks. To guarantee balanced growth in the nonstochastic steady state, we require that each element in [φt, Gt ]
grows at the same rate as z+t in steady state. Following Christiano et al. (2011a), we assume:
[φt, Gt]
′ = [φ, G]′ t . (3.20)






where 0 < θ ≤ 1 is a parameter to be estimated. With this specification, t/z+t converges to a constant in nonstochastic 
steady state. When θ is close to zero, t is virtually unresponsive in the short-run to an innovation in either of the two 
technology shocks, a feature that we find attractive on a priori grounds. Given the specification of the exogenous processes 
in the model, Yt/z+t , Ct/z+t and It/(t z+t ) converge to constants in nonstochastic steady state.
In terms of fiscal policy, we assume that lump-sum transfers balance the government budget.
Finally, we assume the following functional forms. For the capacity utilization cost function a we adopt the functional 
form:
a(uKt ) = σaσb(uKt )2/2 + σb (1 − σa) uKt + σb (σa/2 − 1) ,
where σa and σb are the parameters of this function. For a given value of σa we select σb so that the steady state value of 
uKt is unity. The object, σa , is a parameter to be estimated.
We assume that the investment adjustment cost function takes the form:














Here, μz+ and μ denote the unconditional growth rates of z+t and t . The value of It/It−1 in nonstochastic steady state 
is (μz+μ). In addition, S ′′ denotes the second derivative of S (·), evaluated at steady state. The object, S ′′ , is a parameter 
to be estimated. It is straightforward to verify that S (μz+μ) = S ′ (μz+μ) = 0.
We assume the following functional form for the impact of aggregate economic conditions on the worker’s probability 
to find a job:
M (m̄t/m̄t−1) = 100ω(m̄t/m̄t−1 − 1) .
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that η̃t = η + M(m̄t/m̄t−1) and p(el,t; η̃t) = η̃t + ael,t . That is if, for example, ω < 0, then this implies that an inflow of 
workers into the labor force reduces the probability of a worker to find a job. Importantly, it is the rate of change of the 
labor force that reduces the job finding probability of a worker. Intuitively, one might think about this as a bottleneck-type 
access to the labor market. When the labor force grows rapidly, many workers get ‘stuck’ in the process of finding work. 
In spirit of the various adjustment cost specifications in estimated medium-sized New Keynesian models, according to our 
specification, it is not the level of the labor force but its rate of change that affects the probability of a worker to find a 
job. In effect, if ω < 0, our specification implies a more gradual adjustment of the labor force in response to shocks in line 
with model specifications with labor force adjustment costs as in e.g. Erceg and Levin (2014) and Christiano et al. (2015). 
We will elaborate more on the effects of our functional form assumption for the impact of aggregate economic conditions 
on the worker’s probability to find a job for the quantitative properties of our medium-sized New Keynesian model below 
when we discuss our model estimation results.
3.5. Aggregate labor force and unemployment in our model
We now derive our model’s implications for unemployment and the labor market. At the level of the jth household, 
unemployment and the labor force are defined in the same way as in the previous section, except that the endogenous 
variables now have a j subscript (the parameters and shocks are the same across households). Thus, the jth households’s 
labor force, m j,t , and total employment, h j,t , are related by (3.8) and l̊ j,t is given by (2.15). Log-linearizing these expressions 
gives:
hĥ j,t = −η̃m
(̂̃ηt + m̂ j,t)+ (σL + 1)a2ςσL (mσL+1m̂ j,t − l̊σL+1̂l̊ j,t) (3.22)
σLl̊
σL ˚̂l j,t = σLmσL m̂ j,t − η̃
ς (1 + σL)a2
̂̃ηt
Variables without subscript denote steady state values in the jth household. Because we have made assumptions which 
guarantee that each household is identical in steady state, we drop the j subscripts from all steady state labor market 
variables (see the discussion after (3.11)).











Using the fact that, to first order, type j wage deviations from the aggregate wage cancel, we obtain:
ĥt = Ĥt . (3.23)
See section B.7 in the technical appendix for a derivation. That is, to a first order approximation, the percent deviation of 
aggregate household hours from steady state coincides with the percent deviation of aggregate homogeneous hours from 
steady state. Integrating (3.22) over all j and substituting for ̂l̊t yields:
hĥt =
(















where ̂̃ηt = η̃t−η̃η̃ . Aggregate unemployment is defined as ut ≡ mt−htmt so that dut = hm (m̂t − ĥt) where dut denotes the 
deviation of unemployment from its steady state value, not the percent deviation.
3.6. The standard model
We derive the utility function used in the standard model as a special case of the household utility function in our 
involuntary unemployment model. In part, we do this to ensure consistency across models. In part, we do this as a way of 
emphasizing that we interpret the labor input in the utility function in the standard model as corresponding to the number 
of people working, not, say, the hours worked of a representative person. With our interpretation, the curvature of the labor 
disutility function corresponds to the (consumption compensated) elasticity with which people enter or leave the labor 
force in response to a change in the wage rate. In particular, this curvature does not correspond to the elasticity with which 
the typical person adjusts the quantity of hours worked in response to a wage change. Empirically, the latter elasticity is 
estimated to be small and it is fixed at zero in the model.
Another advantage of deriving the standard model from ours is that it puts us in position to exploit an insight by Galí 
(2011). In particular, Galí (2011) shows that the standard model already has a theory of unemployment implicit in it. The 
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competition. The number of workers for which the wage is greater than the cost of work exceeds the number of people 
employed. Galí suggests defining this excess of workers as ‘unemployed’. The implied unemployment rate and labor force 
represent a natural benchmark to compare with our model.
Notably, deriving an unemployment rate and labor force in the standard model does not introduce any new parameters. 
Moreover, there is no change in the equilibrium conditions that determine non-labor market variables. Galí’s insight in 
effect simply adds a block recursive system of two equations to the standard DSGE model which determine the size of the 
labor force and unemployment. Although the unemployment rate derived in this way does not satisfy all the criteria for 
unemployment that we described in the introduction, it nevertheless provides a natural benchmark for comparison with 
our model. An extensive comparison of the economics of our approach to unemployment versus the approach implicit in 
the standard model appears in the appendix to this paper.
We suppose that in the standard model, the household has full information about its member workers and that workers 
which join the labor force automatically receive a job without having to expend any effort. As in the previous subsections, 
we suppose that corresponding to each type j of labor, there is a unit measure of workers which gather together into 
a household. At the beginning of each period, each worker draws a random variable, l, from a uniform distribution with 
support, [0,1]. The random variable, l, determines a worker’s aversion to work according to (2.1). The fact that no effort 
is needed to find a job implies mt, j = ht, j . Workers with l ≤ ht, j work and workers with ht, j ≤ l ≤ 1 take leisure. The type 
j household allocation problem is to maximize the utility of its member workers with respect to consumption for non-
working workers, cnwt, j , and consumption of working workers, c
w
t, j , subject to (2.20), and the given values of ht, j and Ct . In 
Lagrangian form, the problem is:
u
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cwt, j − bCt−1
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cnwt, j − bCt−1
)
dl + λ j,t
[
Ct − ht, jcwt, j −
(





Here, λ j,t > 0 denotes the multiplier on the resource constraint. The first order conditions imply cwt, j = cnwt, j = Ct . Imposing 
this result and evaluating the integral, we find:
u
(
Ct − bCt−1,h j,t
)= ln (Ct − bCt−1) − ςh1+σLt, j . (3.24)
The problem of the household is identical to what it is in section 3.3, with the sole exception that the utility function, 
(3.10), is replaced by (3.24).
A type j worker that draws work aversion index l is defined to be unemployed if the following two conditions are 
satisfied:
(a) l > h j,t, (b) υt W j,t > ς (1 + σL) lσL . (3.25)
Here, υt denotes the multiplier on the budget constraint, (3.13), in the Lagrangian representation of the household optimiza-
tion problem. Expression (a) in (3.25) simply says that to be unemployed, the worker must not be employed. Expression 
(b) in (3.25) determines whether a non-employed worker is unemployed or not in the labor force. The object on the left of 
the inequality in (b) is the value assigned by the household to the wage, W j,t . The object on the right of (b) is the fixed 
cost of going to work for the lth worker. Galí (2010) suggests defining workers with l satisfying (3.25) as unemployed. This 
approach to unemployment does not satisfy properties (i) and (iii) in the introduction. The approach does not meet the 
official definition of unemployment because no one is exercising effort to find a job. In addition, the existence of perfect 
consumption insurance implies that unemployed workers enjoy higher utility than employed workers.
We use (3.25) to define the labor force, mt , in the standard model. With mt and aggregate employment, ht , we obtain the 




. Here, h < m because 
of the presence of monopoly power. The object, ĥt may be obtained from (3.23) and the solution to the standard model. 
We now discuss the computation of the aggregate labor force, mt . We have mt ≡
∫ 1
0 m j,tdj where m j,t is the labor force 
associated with the jth type of labor and is defined by enforcing (b) in (3.25) at equality. After linearization m̂t ≡
∫ 1
0 m̂ j,tdj. 
We compute m̂ j,t by linearizing the equation that defines m̂ j,t . After scaling (3.25), we obtain
ψt w̄t ẘ j,t = ς (1 + σL)mσLj,t, (3.26)
where ψt ≡ υt Pt z+t , w̄t ≡ Wtz+t Pt , ẘ j,t ≡
W j,t
Wt
. Log-linearizing (3.26) around the steady state and integrating the result over 
all j ∈ (0,1):
ψ̂t + ̂̄wt + 1∫
0
̂̊w j,tdj = σLm̂t .
From the result in section B.7 in the technical appendix, the integral in the above expression is zero, so that:





We estimate the parameters of the model in the previous section using the impulse response matching approach applied 
by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), CEE, ACEL and other papers. We apply the Bayesian version of that method proposed 
in CTW. Specifically, our estimation machinery makes use of priors and posteriors, as well as the marginal likelihood as 
a measure of model fit in our impulse response function matching estimation. The advantage of the Bayesian impulse re-
sponse matching estimation approach that we use is transparency and focus.25 The transparency reflects that the estimation 
strategy has a simple graphical representation, involving objects - impulse response functions - about which economists 
have often very strong intuition. The advantage of focus comes from the possibility of studying the empirical properties of 
a model without having to specify a full set of shocks.
Impulse response matching estimation is often very useful when crafting new models with new transmission channels 
since the estimation procedure is very transparent and allows the researcher to focus on the particular new model features 
and new transmission mechanisms when taking the model to the data. Given that our paper is about constructing a new 
labor market model, we find the impulse response matching procedure particularly attractive.
To promote comparability of results across the two papers and to simplify the discussion here, we use the impulse 
response functions and associated probability intervals estimated using the 14 variable, 2 lag vector autoregression (VAR) 
estimated in CTW.26 Here, we consider the response of 11 variables to three shocks: the monetary policy shock, εR,t in 
equation (3.18), the neutral technology shock, εt in equation (3.3), and the investment specific shock, εt in equation (3.4).27
Nine of the eleven variables whose responses we consider are the standard macroeconomic variables displayed in Figs. 1–3. 
The other two variables are the unemployment rate and the labor force which are shown in Fig. 4. The VAR is estimated 
using quarterly, seasonally adjusted data covering the period 1952Q1 to 2008Q4.
The assumptions that allow us to identify the effects of our three shocks are the ones implemented in ACEL and Fisher 
(2006). To identify the monetary policy shock we suppose all variables aside from the nominal rate of interest are unaffected 
contemporaneously by the policy shock.28 We make two assumptions to identify the dynamic response to the technology 
shocks: (i) the only shocks that affect labor productivity in the long run are the two technology shocks and (ii) the only 
shock that affects the price of investment relative to consumption is the innovation to the investment specific shock.29
We emphasize that our medium-sized model structure is such that it is in line with the identifying assumptions for the 
monetary policy shock as well as for the two types technology shocks in the VAR. That is, the timing of monetary policy 
shocks as well as the long-run effects of technology shocks coincide in the model and the VAR.
Let ψ̂ denote the vector of impulse responses used in the analysis here. Since we consider 15 lags in the impulses, there 
are in principle 3 (i.e., the number of shocks) times 11 (number of variables) times 15 (number of lags) = 495 elements in 
ψ̂ . However, we do not include in ψ̂ the 10 contemporaneous responses to the monetary policy shock that are required to 
be zero by our monetary policy identifying assumption. Taking the latter into account, the vector ψ̂ has 485 elements. To 
conduct a Bayesian analysis, we require a likelihood function for our data, ψ̂ . For this, we use an approximation based on 




ψ̂ − ψ (θ0)
) a
˜ N (0, W (θ0, ζ0)) . (4.1)
Here, θ0 and ζ0 are the parameters of the model that generated the data, evaluated at their true values. The parameter 
vector, θ0, is the set of parameters that is explicit in our model, while ζ0 contains the parameters of stochastic processes 
25 Another advantage of the impulse response matching estimation compared to full information estimation is that the former does not require the 
underlying data to be normally distributed while the latter does.
26 See CTW for a sensitivity analysis with respect to the lag length of the VAR. Further, see the technical appendix in CTW for details about the data.
27 The VAR in CTW also includes data on vacancies, job findings and job separations, but these variables do not appear in the models in this paper and 
so we do not include their impulse responses in the analysis.
28 This timing assumption has a long history in macroeconomics. The basic idea is that when a monetary policy shock occurs, many spending and other 
economic decisions are already under way, so that the economy’s response to the shock occurs with a delay. Lengthy discussions of this assumption appear 
in Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and an even earlier discussion is Friedman (1959)’s testimony before Congress: “Monetary and fiscal policy is rather like 
a water tap that you turn on now and that then only starts to run 6, 9, 12, 16 months from now”. A very recent discussion appears in Jarociński and 
Karadi (2020). They display some direct evidence on the idea that monetary policy shocks have no immediate impact on aggregate variables. They report 
(see their Fig. 2), that the contemporaneous response of output to an exogenous shock to monetary policy shock is numerically zero. Their identification 
strategy, based on high-frequency methods, does not require that response to be zero.
29 Details of our strategy for computing impulse response functions imposing the shock identification are discussed in ACEL.40 L.J. Christiano et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 39 (2021) 26–54
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Fig. 1. Dynamic responses to a monetary policy shock.
Fig. 2. Dynamic responses to a neutral technology shock.
42 L.J. Christiano et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 39 (2021) 26–54Fig. 3. Dynamic responses to an investment-specific technology shock.
not included in the analysis. In (4.1), W (θ0, ζ0) is the asymptotic sampling variance of ψ̂ , which - as indicated by the 
notation - is a function of all model parameters. We find it convenient to express (4.1) in the following form:
ψ̂
a
˜ N (ψ (θ0) , V ) , (4.2)
where V ≡ W (θ0,ζ0)T . For simplicity our notation does not make the dependence of V on θ0, ζ0 and T explicit. We treat V
as though it were known. In practice, we work with a consistent estimator of V in our analysis (for details, see CTW). That 
estimator is a diagonal matrix with only the variances along the diagonal. An advantage of this diagonality property is that 
our estimator has a simple graphical representation.30



















ψ̂ − ψ (θ)
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As usual, the mode of the posterior distribution of θ can be computed by simply maximizing the value of the numerator in 
(4.4), since the denominator is not a function of θ . The marginal density of ψ̂ is required when we want an overall measure 
30 The diagonal matrix V makes the estimator particularly transparent. Specifically, the estimator then corresponds to selecting the set of estimated 
parameters such that the model impulse responses lie inside a confidence tunnel around the estimated VAR impulses. If we instead had allowed for non-
diagonal terms in V , then the estimator aims not just to put the model impulses inside a confidence tunnel about the VAR point estimates, but it is also 
concerned about the pattern of discrepancies across different impulse responses. In addition, by using a diagonal variance-covariance matrix V we ensure 
maximum comparability with the existing literature, including Christiano et al. (2005) and ACEL who also imposed this structure on V .
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Table 1
Non-estimated parameters in medium-sized model.
Parameter Value Description
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
β 0.99678 Discount factor
π 1.00625 Gross inflation rate
ηg 0.2 Government consumption to GDP ratio
κw 1 Wage indexation
λw 1.01 Wage markup
ξw 0.75 Wage stickiness
400lnμz+ 1.7 Annual output per capita growth rate
400lnμz+μ 2.9 Annual investment per capita growth rate
of the fit of our model and when we want to report the shape of the posterior marginal distribution of individual elements 
in θ . We do this using the MCMC algorithm.
5. Estimation results for the medium-sized model
The first subsection below discusses model parameter values. We then show that our model of involuntary unemploy-
ment does well at accounting for the dynamics of unemployment and the labor force. Fortunately, the model is able to do 
this without compromising its ability to account for the dynamics of standard macroeconomic variables.
5.1. Parameters
Parameters whose values are set a priori are listed in Table 1. We found that when we estimated the parameters, κw and 
λw , the estimator drove them to their boundaries. This is why we simply set λw to a value near unity and we set κw = 1. 
The steady state value of inflation (a parameter in the monetary policy rule and the price and wage updating equations), the 
steady state government consumption to output ratio, and the growth rate of investment-specific technology were chosen 
to coincide with their corresponding sample means in our data set.31 The growth rate of neutral technology was chosen 
31 In our model, the relative price of investment goods represents a direct observation of the technology shock for producing investment goods.
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Price Stickiness ξp Beta 0.67 0.616 0.727
[0, 1] [0.45 0.83] [0.55 0.71] [0.67 0.78]
Price Markup λ f Gamma 1.19 1.230 1.399
[1.001, ∞] [1.01 1.40] [1.10 1.36] [1.29 1.54]
Monetary Authority Parameters
Taylor Rule: Int. Smoothing ρR Beta 0.76 0.873 0.890
[0, 1] [0.37 0.93] [0.82 0.90] [0.85 0.91]
Taylor Rule: Inflation Coef. rπ Gamma 1.68 1.395 1.414
[1.001, ∞] [1.41 2.00] [1.19 1.65] [1.19 1.69]
Taylor Rule: GDP Coef. ry Gamma 0.07 0.077 0.113
[0, ∞] [0.02 0.21] [0.03 0.14] [0.05 0.18]
Preference Parameters
Consumption Habit b Beta 0.75 0.761 0.776
[0, 1] [0.64 0.83] [0.72 0.79] [0.74 0.80]
Inverse Labor Supply Elast. σz Gamma 0.26 0.165 0.334
[0, ∞] [0.13 0.52] [0.08 0.23] [0.17 0.43]
Replacement Ratio cnw/cw Beta 0.75 − 0.797
[0, 1] [0.69 0.79] − [0.76 0.82]
Labor Force Impact on p(e, η̃) ω Normal 0.0 − −0.533
[−∞, ∞] [−1.96 1.96] − [−0.74 −0.38]
Technology Parameters
Capital Share α Beta 0.32 0.31 0.270
[0, 1] [0.28 0.37] [0.25 0.33] [0.24 0.31]
Technology Diffusion θ Beta 0.50 0.052 0.015
[0, 1] [0.12 0.86] [0.01 0.80] [0.01 0.05]
Capacity Adj. Costs Curv. σa Gamma 0.31 0.462 0.256
[0, ∞] [0.09 1.22] [0.21 0.56] [0.10 0.59]
Investment Adj. Costs Curv. S
′′
Gamma 7.50 11.56 15.72
[0, ∞] [4.56 12.29] [8.46 14.92] [11.46 18.78]
Shocks
Autocorr. Invest. Tech. ρψ Beta 0.78 0.703 0.704
[0, 1] [0.53 0.91] [0.54 0.77] [0.59 0.82]
Std.Dev. Neutral Tech. Shock σn Inv. Gamma 0.06 0.211 0.194
[0, ∞] [0.04 0.44] [0.18 0.25] [0.17 0.23]
Std.Dev. Invest. Tech. Shock σψ Inv. Gamma 0.06 0.125 0.115
[0, ∞] [0.04 0.44] [0.09 0.17] [0.08 0.15]
Std.Dev. Monetary Shock σR Inv. Gamma 0.22 0.496 0.449
[0, ∞] [0.14 1.49] [0.41 0.60] [0.37 0.53]
so that, conditional on the growth rate of investment-specific technology, the steady state growth rate of output in the 
model coincides with the corresponding sample average in the data. We set ξw = 0.75, so that the model implies wages are 
reoptimized once a year on average. We did not estimate this parameter because we found that it is difficult to separately 
identify the value of ξw and the curvature of household labor disutility.
The parameters for which we report priors and posteriors are listed in Table 2. The posterior mode and parameter 
distributions are based on a standard MCMC algorithm with a total of 2.5 million draws based on 10 chains. We use the 
first 20 percent of draws for burn-in. The acceptance rates are about 0.25 in each chain. We report results for two estimation 
exercises. In the first exercise we estimate the standard DSGE model discussed in section 3.6. In this exercise we only use 
the impulse responses of standard macroeconomic variables in the likelihood criterion, (4.3). In particular, we do not include 
the impulse responses of the unemployment rate or the labor force when we estimate the standard DSGE model.32 Results 
based on this exercise appear under the heading, ‘standard model’. In the second exercise we estimate our model with 
involuntary unemployment and we report those results under the heading, ‘involuntary unemployment model’.
We make several observations about the parameters listed in Table 2. First, the results in the last two columns are 
relatively similar. This reflects that the two models (i) are observationally equivalent relative to the impulse responses of 
standard macroeconomic variables and (ii) no substantial adjustments to the parameters are required for the involuntary 
unemployment model to fit the unemployment and labor force data.
32 Subection 5.3 in the appendix discusses the implications when unemployment and the labor force are included in the estimation in the standard model.
L.J. Christiano et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 39 (2021) 26–54 45Table 3






pk′ k/y 8.765 7.665 Capital to GDP ratio (quarterly)
c/y 0.519 0.554 Consumption to GDP ratio
i/y 0.281 0.246 Investment to GDP ratio
H = h 0.628 0.628 Steady state labor input
cnw/cw 1.000 0.797 Replacement ratio
R 1.014 1.014 Gross nominal interest rate (quarterly)
Rreal 1.0075 1.0075 Gross real interest rate (quarterly)
u 0.059 0.055 Unemployment rate
m – 0.665 Labor force (involuntary unemployment model)
l∗ 0.668 – Labor force (standard model)
l̊ – 0.504 Share of workers with p(e; η̃) = 1
ς 1.936 0.609 Slope, labor disutility
σL 0.165 4.287 Curvature, labor disutility
η – −0.467 Intercept, p(e; η̃)
a – 1.170 Slope, p(e; η̃)
In the estimation of the involuntary unemployment model, we calculate the four parameters η, a, σL , ς endogenously 
so as to set the following objects exogenously: h, m, zhhhzh = σ
target
z , r = cw/cnw = rtarget. See section C.2 in the technical 
appendix for more details. We set h = 0.628 and m = 0.665 which yields a steady state unemployment rate of 0.055. We 
estimate the values of σ targetz and rtarget. The resulting values for η, a, σL , ς at the estimated posterior mode of the estimated 
parameters are provided in Table 3.
In the estimation of the standard model, we apply an analogous treatment to worker parameter values. In particular, 
throughout the estimation we fix the steady state level of hours worked, h = 0.628 and calculate the value of the parameter 
ς endogenously. The resulting value for ς at the estimated posterior mode of the estimated parameters is provided in 
Table 3. Similar to the involuntary unemployment model, we also estimate the value of zhhhzh = σ
target
z in the standard 
model. Note, however, that given the preference specification of the standard model, σz = σL (evaluate (2.24) using (3.24)).
Turning to the parameter values themselves, note first that the degree of price stickiness, ξp , is modest. The implied time 
between price reoptimizations is a little less than 3 quarters in the standard model and a little less than 4 quarters in the 
involuntary unemployment model. The amount of information in the likelihood, (4.3), about the value of ξp is reasonably 
large in both models. The posterior standard deviation is roughly an order of magnitude smaller than the prior standard 
deviation and the posterior probability interval is half the length of the prior probability interval. Generally, the amount of 
information in the likelihood about all the parameters is large in this sense. An exception to this pattern is the coefficient 
on inflation in the Taylor rule, rπ . There appears to be relatively little information about this parameter in the likelihood. 
Note that σz is estimated to be quite small, implying a consumption-compensated labor supply elasticity for the household 
of around 6 in the standard model and 3 in the involuntary unemployment model. Such high elasticities would be regarded 
as empirically implausible if it was interpreted as the elasticity of supply of hours by an individual worker. But this elasticity 
should instead be interpreted as the elasticity at the household level incorporating all individual workers who are part of 
the household. Put differently, in our model of involuntary unemployment, the elasticity of labor supply is quite large at 
the household level as an outcome of our limited labor market insurance arrangement. By contrast the elasticity of labor 
supply is quite small at the individual worker level, consistent with micro evidence. For further discussion of this distinction 
between measures of individual and household-level labor supply elasticities, see section 2.3, in CTW.
The consumption replacement ratio, r = cnw/cw , is a novel feature of our model, that does not appear in standard 
monetary DSGE models. The replacement ratio is estimated to be roughly 80 percent. This is close to the value used for 
calibration by Landais et al. (2018). It is higher than the estimates of Hamermesh (1982) but somewhat lower than the 
empirical estimate of 90 percent reported by Chetty and Looney (2007) and Gruber (1997) mentioned in the introduction. 
Also, our consumption replacement ratio appears to be higher than the number reported for developed countries in OECD 
(2006). However, the replacement ratios reported by OECD pertain to income, rather than consumption.33 So, they are likely 
to underestimate the consumption concept relevant for us.
Table 2 reveals that the estimated value of the parameter governing the impact of the labor force on the probability of 
a worker to find a job is ω = −0.533. Recall that we use a standard normal prior, i.e. we are agnostic about the sign of ω. 
The data is informative about the sign of ω being negative. Note that ω < 0 implies that an inflow of workers into the labor 
force reduces the probability of a worker to find a job. The negative value of ω helps the model to account for the slow 
response of the labor force to shocks, see Figs. 1–3 which are discussed in the next subsection. To examine the sensitivity 
of our results we re-estimated the involuntary unemployment model with ω set to zero. Technical appendix Table A.2 
33 The income replacement ratio for the US is reported to be 54 percent in Table 3.2, which can be found at http://www.oecd .org /dataoecd /28 /9 /36965805 .
pdf.
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contains the corresponding estimated parameters and technical appendix Figs. 1 through 4 show the corresponding impulse 
responses. The impulse responses show that the model fit deteriorates when ω is set to zero instead of being set to its 
estimated value of ω = −0.533. The principal impact of ω is on the response of the labor market variables and inflation 
to a monetary shock. The qualitative implications of the model remain unchanged, including the positive hump-shaped 
response of the labor force to an expansionary monetary policy shock. The effects of ω < 0 are to reduce the magnitude of 
the peak response that occurs when ω = 0 and to delay the timing of that peak. When ω = 0, the response of inflation to 
a monetary shock is qualitatively similar, but quantitatively much weaker than in the data. Setting ω to its estimated value 
has the effect of making the VAR and model impulse responses of inflation virtually the same. The marginal data density of 
the involuntary unemployment model with ω = 0 is about 60 log points lower than the baseline involuntary unemployment 
model with ω = −0.533.
Finally, Table 3 reports steady state properties of the estimated standard model as well as the estimated baseline invol-
untary unemployment model, both evaluated at the posterior mode of the parameters.
5.2. Impulse response functions of macroeconomic variables
Figs. 1–3 display the results of the indicated macroeconomic variables to our three shocks. In each case, the solid black 
line is the point estimate of the dynamic response to a one standard deviation shock generated by our estimated VAR. The 
gray area is an estimate of the corresponding 95% probability interval.34 Our estimation strategy selects a model parameter-
ization that places the model-implied impulse response functions as close as possible to the center of the gray area, while 
not suffering too much of a penalty from the priors. The estimation criterion is less concerned about reproducing VAR-based 
impulse response functions where the gray areas are the widest.
The thick solid line and the line with solid squares in the figures display the impulse responses of the standard model 
and the involuntary unemployment model, respectively, at the posterior mean of the parameters. Note in Figs. 1–3 that in 
many cases only one of these two lines is visible. Moreover, in cases where a distinction between the two lines can be 
discerned, they are nevertheless very close. This reflects that the two models account roughly equally well for the impulse 
responses to the three shocks. This is a key result. Expanding the standard model to include unemployment and the labor 
34 We compute the probability interval as follows. We simulate 2,500 sets of impulse response functions by generating an equal number of artificial data 
sets, each of length T, using the VAR estimated from the data. Here, T denotes the number of observations in our actual data set. We compute the standard 
deviations of the artificial impulse response functions. The gray areas in Figs. 1–5 are the estimated impulse response functions plus and minus 1.96 times 
the corresponding standard deviation.
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macroeconomic variables to monetary policy and technology shocks.
Consider Fig. 1, which displays the response of standard macroeconomic variables to an expansionary monetary policy 
shock (i.e., a negative shock to εR,t ). Note how the model captures the slow response of inflation. Indeed, the model even 
captures the ‘price puzzle’ phenomenon, according to which inflation moves in the ‘wrong’ direction initially. This apparently 
perverse initial response of inflation is interpreted by the model as reflecting the reduction in labor costs associated with the 
cut in the nominal rate of interest.35 It is interesting that the slow response of inflation is accounted for with a fairly modest 
degree of wage and price-setting frictions. The model captures the response of output and consumption to a monetary policy 
shock reasonably well. However, there is a substantial miss on capacity utilization. Also, the model apparently does not have 
the flexibility to capture the relatively sharp rise and fall in the investment response, although the model responses lie inside 
the gray area. The relatively large estimate of the curvature in the investment adjustment cost function, S ′′ , reflects that to 
allow a greater response of investment to a monetary policy shock would cause the model’s prediction of investment to lie 
outside the gray area in the initial and later quarters. These findings for monetary policy shocks are broadly similar to those 
reported in CEE, ACEL and CTW.
Fig. 2 displays the response of standard macroeconomic variables to a neutral technology shock. Note that the models 
do reasonably well at reproducing the empirically estimated responses. The dynamic response of inflation is particularly 
notable. The estimation results in ACEL suggest that the sharp and precisely estimated drop in inflation in response to 
a neutral technology shock is difficult to reproduce in a model like the standard monetary DSGE model. In describing this 
problem for their model, ACEL express a concern that the failure reflects a deeper problem with sticky price models. Perhaps 
the emphasis on price and wage setting frictions, largely motivated by the inertial response of inflation to a monetary shock, 
is shown to be misguided by the evidence that inflation responds rapidly to technology shocks.36 Our results suggest a far 
more mundane possibility. There are two differences between our model and the one in ACEL which allow it to reproduce 
the response of inflation to a technology shock more or less exactly without hampering its ability to account for the slow 
response of inflation to a monetary policy shock. First, as discussed above, in our model there is no indexation of prices to 
lagged inflation. ACEL follows CEE in supposing that when firms cannot optimize their price, they index it fully to lagged 
aggregate inflation. The position of our model on price indexation is a key reason why we can account for the rapid fall in 
inflation after a neutral technology shock while ACEL cannot. We suspect that our way of treating indexation is a step in 
the right direction from the point of view of microeconomic data. Micro observations suggest that individual prices do not 
change for extended periods of time. A second distinction between our model and the one in ACEL is that we specify the 
neutral technology shock to be a random walk (see (3.3)), while in ACEL the growth rate of the estimated technology shock 
is highly autocorrelated. In ACEL, a technology shock triggers a strong wealth effect which stimulates a surge in demand 
that places upward pressure on marginal cost and thus inflation.37
Fig. 3 displays dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables to an investment-specific shock. The evidence indicates 
that the two models, parameterized at their posterior means, do well in accounting for these responses.
5.3. Impulse response functions of unemployment and the labor force
Fig. 4 displays the response of unemployment and the labor force to our three shocks. The key thing to note is that 
the model has no difficulty accounting for the pattern of responses. The probability bands are large, but the point estimates 
suggest that unemployment falls about 0.2 percentage points and the labor force rises a small amount after an expansionary 
monetary policy shock. The model roughly reproduces this pattern. In the case of each response, the model generates 
opposing movements in the labor force and the unemployment rate. This appears to be consistent with the evidence.
As discussed in section 3.6 above, Galí (2011) points out that the standard model has implicit in it a theory of unemploy-
ment and the labor force. Fig. 5 adds the implications of the standard model for these variables to the impulses displayed 
in Fig. 4 when data for unemployment and the labor force are not part of the dataset used in the standard model. Note 
that the impulses implied by the standard model are so large that they distort the scale in Fig. 5. Consider, for example, 
the first panel of graphs in the figure, which pertain to the monetary policy shock. The standard model predicts a massive 
fall in the labor force after an expansionary monetary policy shock. The reason is that the rise in aggregate consumption 
(see Fig. 1) reduces the value of work by reducing υt in (3.25). The resulting sharp drop in labor supply strongly contradicts 
our VAR-based evidence which suggests a small rise. Given the standard model’s prediction for the labor force, it is not 
surprising that the model massively over-predicts the fall in the unemployment rate after a monetary expansion.
35 For a defense, based on firm-level data, of the existence of this ‘working capital’ channel of monetary policy, see Barth and Ramey (2001).
36 The concern is reinforced by the fact that an alternative approach, one based on information imperfections and minimal price/wage setting frictions, 
seems like a natural one for explaining the puzzle of the slow response of inflation to monetary policy shocks and the quick response to technology shocks 
(see Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009; Mendes, 2009, and Paciello, 2011). Dupor et al. (2009) suggest more modest changes in the model structure to 
accommodate the inflation puzzle.
37 An additional, important, factor accounting for the damped response of inflation to a monetary policy shock (indeed, the perverse initial ‘price puzzle’ 
phenomenon) is the assumption that firms must borrow in advance to pay for their variable production costs. But, this model feature is present in both 
our model and ACEL as well as CEE.
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impose the corresponding VAR impulse responses in the estimation. When doing so, the unemployment rate and labor force 
responses are virtually flat after the monetary shock, which is counterfactual with respect to the VAR evidence. Basically, the 
estimation procedure selects parameters such that the unemployment rate and labor force do not fall as much as displayed 
in Fig. 5.38 However, selecting parameters in the standard model to basically shut down the responses of unemployment 
and the labor force comes at a heavy cost: the fit of all other macroeconomic data deteriorates sharply in this case. See 
Figs. A.1 to A.4 in the appendix and Table A.1 in the technical appendix for the estimated parameter values. Therefore, our 
model of involuntary unemployment outperforms the standard model when both models face the same dataset including 
unemployment and the labor force. Quantitatively, the log data density at the posterior mode for our involuntary unemploy-
ment model is about 200 log points higher than the one for the standard model. See appendix section A.1 for an in-depth 
discussion of the underlying estimation results for the standard model in this case.
The failure of the standard model raises a puzzle. Why does our involuntary unemployment model do so well at ac-
counting for the unemployment rate and the labor force? The puzzle is interesting because the two models have household 
utility functions with comparable form (recall the indirect utility function in our model, eq. (3.10)). One might imagine that 
our model would have the same problem with wealth effects. In fact, it does not have the same problem because there is a 
connection in our model between the labor force and employment that does not exist in the standard model. In our model, 
the increased consumption premium from holding a job that occurs in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock 
simultaneously encourages workers to search for work more intensely, and to substitute into the labor force.
The standard model’s prediction for the response of the unemployment rate and the labor force to neutral and 
investment-specific technology shocks is also strongly counterfactual. The problem is always the same, and reflects the 
operation of wealth effects on labor supply.
The problems in Fig. 5 with the standard model motivate Galí (2011) and Galí et al. (2011) to modify the worker utility 
function in the standard model in ways that reduce wealth effects on labor. Our view is that modifying the utility function 
is not the right way to go as microdata evidence indicate substantial and immediate wealth effects on labor supply. For 
example, Cesarini et al. (2017) find that winning a lottery prize reduces individual labor earnings already within a year, 
with very persistent effects thereafter. Earnings fall by approximately 1.1 percent of the prize amount per year. Somewhat 
stronger effects are documented by Imbens et al. (2001) who find that the discounted value of earnings falls by 11% in 
response to an exogenous increase in unearned income, i.e. a lottery prize. There is also macroeconomic evidence indicating 
that wealth effects on labor supply are non-negligible. Specifically, Mertens and Ravn (2011) use VAR evidence to show 
that the economy contracts in response to anticipated tax cuts. They then account for the VAR evidence by using a DSGE 
model with standard wealth preferences. In effect, our involuntary unemployment model represents an alternative strategy 
for dealing with these wealth effects. Our model has the added advantage of being consistent with all three characteristics 
(i)-(iii) of unemployment described in the introduction.
6. Further evidence in favor of our model
Our model of unemployment has several interesting microeconomic implications that deserve closer attention. The model 
implies that the consumption premium of employed workers over the non-employed, cwt /cnwt , is procyclical or, equivalently, 
the replacement ratio, cnwt /cwt , is countercyclical. Although Chetty and Looney (2007) and Gruber (1997) report that there 
is a premium on average, we cannot infer anything about the cyclicality of the premium from the evidence they present. 
Studies of the cross section variance of log worker consumption are a potential source of evidence on the cyclical behavior 
of the premium. To see this, let Vt denote the variance of log worker consumption in the period t cross section in our 
model39:








According to this expression, the model posits two countervailing forces on the cross-sectional dispersion of consump-
tion, Vt , in a recession. First, for a given distribution of the population across employed and non-employed workers (i.e., 
holding ht fixed), a decrease in the consumption premium leads to a decrease in consumption dispersion in a recession. 
Second, holding the consumption premium fixed, consumption dispersion increases as people move from employment to 
non-employment with the fall in ht .40 These observations suggest that (i) if Vt is observed to drop in recessions, this is 
evidence in favor of the model’s prediction that the consumption premium is procyclical and (ii) if Vt is observed to stay 
38 Note that the standard model is not able to generate a rise in the labor force after an expansionary monetary policy shock. Thus, the “best” response 
possible in that model is a zero labor force response to the monetary shock.
39 Note that the formula for Vt corresponds to the model developed in section 2 of this paper. For the model with capital developed in section 3, 
the relevant formula is more complicated as it requires a non-trivial aggregation across households that supply different types of labor services. To see 
how we derived the formula in the text, note that the cross-sectional mean of log household consumption is Et = ht log
(
cwt
)+ (1 − ht ) log (cnwt ) so that 
Vt = ht
(
log cwt − Et
)2 + (1 − ht ) (log cnwt − Et)2 = ht (1 − ht ) (log cwt − log cnwt )2.
40 This statement assumes that the empirically relevant case applies, i.e. ht > 1/2.
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dence in Heathcote et al. (2010) suggests that the US was in case (i) in three of the previous five recessions.41 In particular, 
they show that the dispersion in log worker non-durable consumption decreased in the 1980, 2001 and 2007 recessions.42
We conclude tentatively that the observed cross-sectional dispersion of consumption across workers lends support to our 
model’s implication that the consumption premium is procyclical. In addition, the fact that the duration of unemployment 
benefits routinely are extended in recessions (e.g. in the US) is an indication that the income premium is procyclical empir-
ically.
Another interesting implication of the model is its prediction that high unemployment in recessions reflects the pro-
cyclicality of effort in job search. There is some evidence that supports this implication of the model. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2009) constructs a measure of the number of discouraged workers. These are people who are available to work 
and have looked for work in the past 12 months, but are not currently looking because they believe no jobs are available. 
This statistic has only been gathered since 1994, and so it covers just two recessions. However, in both the recessions for 
which we have data, the number of discouraged workers increased substantially. For example, the number of discouraged 
workers jumped 70 percent from 2008Q1 to 2009Q1. In fact, the number of discouraged workers is only a tiny fraction of 
the labor force. However, to the extent that the sentiments of discouraged workers are shared by workers more generally, a 
jump in the number of discouraged workers could be a signal of a general decline in job search intensity in recessions. But, 
this is an issue that demands a more careful investigation.
Interestingly, Shimer (2004) reports evidence that search effort may be acyclical or even countercyclical. In his work, 
the number of different search methods that the unemployed use are counted at different stages of the business cycle. We 
interpret Shimer’s finding as reflecting an extensive margin of search, i.e. how many alternative search methods are being 
used. By contrast, our model emphasizes the intensive margin of job search, i.e. how intensely one particular method of 
search is being used by the unemployed. Therefore, our model is not necessarily at odds with the evidence provided by 
Shimer.
7. Concluding remarks
We constructed a model in which workers must make an effort to find work. Because effort is privately observed, perfect 
insurance against labor market outcomes is not feasible. To ensure that people have an incentive to find work, workers that 
find jobs must be better off than people who do not work. With additively separable utility, this translates into the propo-
sition that employed workers have higher consumption than the non-employed. We integrate our model of unemployment 
into a standard monetary DSGE model and find that the model’s ability to account for standard macroeconomic variables is 
not diminished. At the same time, the new model appears to account well for the dynamics of variables like unemployment 
and the labor force.
The theory of unemployment developed here has interesting implications for the optimal variation of labor market 
insurance over the business cycle. In a boom more labor is demanded by firms. To satisfy the higher demand, workers are 
provided with more incentives to look for work by raising consumption for the employed, cwt , relative to consumption of 
the non-employed, cnwt . Conversely, in a recession, the consumption premium falls and thus the replacement ratio, cnwt /cwt , 
increases. Thus, our model implies a procyclical consumption premium – or equivalently – a countercyclical replacement 
ratio. Put differently, optimal labor market insurance is countercyclical in our model.
The empirical results highlight an important implication of our work. In particular, it is in general not sufficient to 
account for the response of only employment or total hours worked to be able to draw conclusions about the unemployment 
rate. In particular, when the standard model is estimated without data on unemployment and the labor force, the fit of total 
hours of the model is in fact very good. By contrast, the implications of the model for unemployment and the labor force 
are counterfactual. Conversely, when the standard model is estimated on unemployment and labor force data too, the fit 
of these two variables improves somewhat. However this improvement of fit comes at the cost of not fitting total hours 
well. In other words, the standard model provides an example that it is not straightforward to account for the dynamics of 
unemployment and labor force participation jointly with other standard macroeconomic variables. By contrast, our model 
does a good job in this regard.
We leave it to future research to quantify the various ways in which the new model may contribute to policy analysis. In 
part, we hope that the model is useful simply because labor market data are of interest in their own right. But, we expect 
the model to be useful even when labor market data are not the central variables of concern. An important input into policy 
analysis is the estimation of ‘latent variables’ such as the output gap and the efficient, or ‘natural’, rate of interest. Other 
important inputs into policy analysis are forecasts of inflation and output. By allowing one to systematically integrate labor 
market information into the usual macroeconomic dataset, our model can be expected to provide more precise forecasts, as 
well as better estimates of latent variables.43 We also believe, in line with Veracierto (2008), that confronting models with 
labor market data such as unemployment and the labor force provides an important test for any business cycle model.
41 Of course, we cannot rule out that the drop in Vt in recessions has nothing to do with the mechanism in our model but rather reflects some other 
source of heterogeneity in the data.
42 A similar observation was made about the 2007 recession in Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009).
43 For an elaboration on this point, see Basistha and Startz (2004) and Christiano et al. (2011a).
Appendix A. Relationship of our work to Galí (2011)
In this section, we discuss the relationship of our work to Galí (2011) beyond those remarks made in the introduction 
and in section 3.6. Our paper emphasizes labor supply in its explanation of the dynamics of unemployment and the labor 
force. Galí adopts a similar perspective. To better explain our model, it is useful to compare its properties with those of 
Galí’s model. Galí demonstrates that with a modest reinterpretation of variables, the standard DSGE model already contains 
a theory of unemployment. In particular, one can define the unemployed as the difference between the number of people 
actually working and the number of people that would be working if the marginal cost of work were equated to the wage 
rate. This difference is positive and fluctuating in the standard DSGE model because of the presence of wage-setting fric-
tions and monopoly power. In effect, unemployment is a symptom of social inefficiency. People inflict unemployment upon 
themselves in the quest for monopoly profits. By contrast, in our model unemployment reflects frictions that are necessary 
for people to find jobs. The existence of unemployment does not require monopoly power. This point is dramatized by the 
fact that we introduce our model in the CGG framework, in which wages are set in competitive labor markets. At the same 
time, the logic of our model does create a positive relationship between monopoly power and unemployment. In our model, 
the employment contraction resulting from an increase in the monopoly power of unions produces a reduction in the incen-
tives for workers to work. Workers’ response to the reduced incentives is to allocate less effort to search, implying higher 
unemployment. So, our model shares the prediction of Galí’s model that unemployment should be higher in economies 
with more union monopoly power. However, our model has additional implications that could differentiate it from Galí’s. 
Ours implies that in economies with more union power both the labor force and the consumption premium for employed 
workers over non-employed workers are reduced. Galí’s model predicts that with more union monopoly power, the labor 
force will be larger. The exact amount by which the labor force increases depends on the strength of wealth effects on 
leisure.
Other important differences between our model of unemployment and Galí’s is that the latter fails to satisfy character-
istics (i) and (iii) in the introduction. Galí’s model assumes, as most of the related literature, that the available jobs can 
be found without effort. Because the model does not satisfy (i), unemployment does not meet the official U.S. definition of 
unemployment. In addition, the presence of perfect insurance in Galí’s model implies that the employed have lower utility 
than the non-employed, violating (iii).
There are more differences between ours and Galí’s theory unemployment. In standard DSGE models, labor supply plays 
little role in the dynamics of standard macro variables like consumption, output, investment, inflation and the interest rate. 
The reason is that the presence of wage setting frictions reduces the importance of labor supply. This is why the New 
Keynesian literature has been relatively unconcerned about all the old puzzles about income effects on labor and labor 
supply elasticities that were a central concern in the real business cycle literature. However, we show that these problems 
are back in full force if one adopts Galí’s theory of unemployment. This is because labor supply corresponds to the labor 
force in that theory. To see how this brings back the old problems, we study the standard DSGE model’s predictions for 
unemployment and the labor force in the wake of an expansionary monetary policy shock. Because that model predicts 
a rise in consumption, the model also predicts a decline in labor supply, as the income effect associated with increased 
consumption produces a fall in the value of work. The drop in labor supply is counterfactual, according to our VAR-based 
evidence. In addition, the large drop in the labor force leads to an counterfactually large drop in unemployment in the wake 
of an expansionary monetary policy shock.
Galí (2011) and Galí et al. (2011) show that changes to the worker utility function that offset wealth effects reduce 
the counterfactual implications of the standard model for the labor force. In effect, our paper proposes a different strategy. 
We preserve the additively separable utility function that is standard in monetary DSGE models, and our model neverthe-
less does not display the labor force problems in the standard DSGE model. This is because in our model the labor force 
and employment have a strong tendency to comove. In our model, the rise in employment in the wake of an expansionary 
monetary policy shock is accomplished by increasing people’s incentives to work. The additional incentives not only encour-
age already active workers to intensify their job search, but also to shift into the labor force. More generally, the analysis 
highlights the fact that modeling unemployment requires thinking carefully about the determinants of the labor force.44
A.1. Estimating the standard model on unemployment and labor force
In this section, we complement the discussion in section 5.3 when the standard model is also estimated on data for the 
unemployment rate and the labor force. In this case, the dataset used in the estimation of our involuntary unemployment 
model and the standard model is identical. Interestingly, there are four parameters that take on very different values at the 
posterior mode compared to the parameter estimates reported in Table 2 when the standard model is not estimated on 
unemployment and the labor force. These parameters are, the inverse labor supply elasticity, σz = σL , the steady state gross 
wage markup, λw , the curvature of capacity adjustment costs, σa and the Taylor rule coefficient, rπ . All other parameters 
listed in Tables 1 and 2 are affected only relatively little when the additional labor market data are taken on board in the 
estimation of the standard model. See technical appendix Table A.1 for the details.
44 Our argument complements the argument in Krusell et al. (2011), who also stress the importance of understanding employment, unemployment and 
the labor force.50 L.J. Christiano et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 39 (2021) 26–54
L.J. Christiano et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 39 (2021) 26–54 51
Fig. A.1. Dynamic responses to monetary policy shock when unemployment rate and labor force data are included in estimation of standard model.
Fig. A.2. Dynamic responses to neutral technology shock when unemployment rate and labor force data are included in estimation of standard model.
52 L.J. Christiano et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 39 (2021) 26–54
Fig. A.3. Dynamic responses to investment-specific technology shock when unemployment rate and labor force data are included in estimation of standard 
model.
Fig. A.4. Dynamic responses of labor market variables to three shocks when unemployment rate and labor force data are included the estimation of standard 
model.
L.J. Christiano et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 39 (2021) 26–54 53For convenience, let’s repeat the equation from section 5.3 that determines the reaction of the labor force in the standard 
model, l̂∗t = ψ̂z+,t+
̂̄wt
σL
, where l̂∗t , ψ̂z+,t and ̂̄wt denote the labor force, marginal utility of consumption and the real wage, 
respectively. In the wake of an expansionary monetary policy shock, marginal utility of consumption falls much more than 
the real wage increases. Thus the labor force falls in the standard model while it rises according to the VAR. The only way 
the standard model can come close to the VAR responses is to drive σz = σL to infinity and thereby shut down the response 
of the labor force. Setting σz = σL to infinity, however, implies a zero labor supply elasticity and will therefore be harmful 
to the model in replicating the VAR responses for e.g. total hours. Thus, the estimation needs to balance the “miss” of the 
model for the labor force and e.g. total hours. It does so by selecting a posterior mode of σz = σL = 18.12 which is much 
higher than the value of about 0.165 reported in Table 2. Note that a value of σz = σL as high as 18.18 relative to 0.165
generates a steady state unemployment rate close to zero when all other parameters are held fixed. In other words, the 
labor supply curve becomes essentially vertical. To enable maximum comparability with the model versions estimated in 
Table 2, we impose the same steady state unemployment rate of 5.5 percent in this experiment too. To do so, we need 
to set the gross wage markup λw = 2.79 at the posterior mode. The higher values of σz = σL and λw imply that marginal 
costs rise much more steeply in response to e.g. an expansionary monetary policy shock. To at least partly offset this, the 
estimation wants to select a much higher steady state gross price markup λ f >> 2 which creates numerical issues in the 
estimation so that we have set λ f to the estimated value of 1.23 in the estimated baseline standard model. Further, to 
at least partly offset the surge in marginal cost, the estimation selects a lower curvature of capacity adjustment costs of 
σa = 0.02, compared to Table 2. Appendix figures A1 to A4 show the responses of the model to the two technology shocks 
and to the monetary shock. Indeed, the standard model now delivers a worse fit for the standard macro variables. Still, 
the fit for unemployment and the labor force is not satisfactory. In terms of fit, the log data density at the posterior mode 
of our involuntary unemployment model is about 200 log points higher than for the standard model. Overall, it turns out 
that our model outperforms the standard model when both models face the same dataset including unemployment and the 
labor force.
Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at https://doi .org /10 .1016 /j .red .2020 .05 .003.
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